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Note on Translation and Transliteration 
 
 
The Library of Congress transliteration system is used in my paper for 
most Russian words and names. However, in the case of cited authors, 
I defer to the publisher’s transliteration if one is provided. For the sake 
of easier reading, I have chosen to render “ё” as “yo” and “й” as “i” in 
my text. The names of famous figures will be presented in their popular 
form, for example “Yeltsin” rather than “El’tsin” is used.  
All translations of Russian texts and lyrics are my own unless otherwise 
noted.  
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Abstract 
 
In the 1990s, packs of tracksuit-clad youth from the suburbs known as 
gopniki descended on Russia’s cities. These problematic youth, 
embodying a unique strain of violent masculinity, rapidly rose in 
prominence during a time of national crisis. The gopniki faded just as 
quickly when Russia entered the new millennium. The influence of 
gopnik worldview did not diminish with the movement, however, and 
gopniki continue to influence Russian culture. This study of primary 
Russian source material examines the theoretical, ideological, and 
historical origins of this under-researched group, and explains their 
lasting influence on Russians in a rapidly changing world. 
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Foreword 
 
quatting with comrades in a knockoff tracksuit or simple shirt and trousers, leather shoes and 
a newsboy cap that nods to the days of the Revolution. A developed body, vulgar vocabulary 
and propensity for violence and cigarettes. The gopnik cuts an immediately recognizable figure 
throughout the former Eastern bloc. Rife during the dying days of the Soviet Union, the gopnik 
identity and style had an outsized impact on Russian culture throughout the 1990s. To this day, 
even with the gopnik less prevalent on the streets, they continue to influence areas as varied as 
fashion,1 hip-hop, visual media, literature and language. 
While other subcultural youth groups have inspired ethnographers and sociologists, such 
as Hilary Pilkington, insufficient work has been done by Western researchers to document this 
impactful group that possibly dwarfed all other neformaly2 when it came to numbers and ubiquity 
across Russia. Aside from cursory descriptions in academic studies of Russian youth culture and 
presentations by memers and bloggers on the internet, the semiotics (outward appearance, actions, 
and more) of the gopnik has not been addressed in depth by English language publications. Even 
Russian sources remark on the lack of academic research3 done on gopniki and other “provincial” 
youth movements not located in Moscow and St. Petersburg.4  
There are several reasons for this lack of prior research. The first being that gopniki in 
general are not known to be the most agreeable, progressive, academically minded, accepting 
people. It is more difficult to interview or do a study on a group that looks at authority and higher 
education with distrust or disdain. Second, the height of gopnik prominence coincided with the 
darkest periods of economic turmoil in Russia. This was an extremely difficult period for all, not 
the least academics, and a large study of miscreants from the suburbs was hardly any department’s 
S 
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funding priority. Further, the Western academics flooding into the newly unlocked country were 
much more interested in Western style youth (i.e., understandable to a Western audience)5 and 
privatization. This paper corrects that omission, relying in large part on Russian-language primary 
source material, illuminating the gopnik phenomenon, theorizing the reasons behind the origin of 
the gopnik culture, detailing the semiotics and habits of its members, and exploring the ways 
gopniki have influenced Russian life and culture. 
This study has three parts. In the first chapter, “The Origin and Evolution of the Gopnik,” 
I explain the social and theoretical origins of the gopniki. I apply theory on gender, masculinity, 
and nationalism to uncover the societal tensions of the late Soviet Union. I trace how the relaxation 
of information during glasnost gave connected urban Soviet youth unequal and unprecedented 
access to Western and alternative identities. This irreversibly upset the built-in hierarchies of the 
USSR by providing meaning outside the confines of Party control and doctrine. The inevitable 
confrontation between urban youth and suburban youth without access to these new West-
influenced identities would lead to the creation of the gopnik identity. The chapter concludes by 
describing how these proto-gopniki of the late 1980s retaliated by violently asserting their form of 
masculinity on Russia’s urban youth.  
In my second chapter, “The Essence of a Real Patsan,” I detail the historical origins and 
practices of the gopniki – a group that has very little scholarly work written about them in English. 
Here, I describe the gopnik masculinity, how it was performed, and explain the reasons behind 
their stereotypical attire, actions, language, and body techniques. I also reveal the historical 
influence of peasant and waif culture on Russia’s 1990s street youth. Finally, I explore what set 
gopniki apart from the neformaly, and why they cannot be classified as a subculture or society. 
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The third chapter, “Squatting Slavs in Tracksuits: The Lasting Imprint of Gopniki on Post-
Soviet Russian Culture,” answers the opening question of this study. Why do gopniki, a widely 
hated group of youth, continue to influence Russian culture 20 years after their physical presence 
all but vanished? In this chapter, I focus on four areas of Russian creative culture: meme, music, 
film, and fashion. The information from my first and second chapters helps explain the cultural 
relevance of specific examples of gopniki in media. I describe how the gopnik identity has affected 
the above cultural fields, and focus on the allure of gop-culture two decades into Putin’s Russia. It 
becomes clear that a combination of the gopnik’s originality, worldview, defiance, and 
Russianness lie at the heart of their present popularity. Indeed, this study highlights that the current 
popularity of gopniki should not be viewed merely as a comical meme of squatting Slavs in 
tracksuits. Rather, the lasting interest of gopniki in Russia may be understood as a populist 
measurement of the clash between Western globalized culture and traditional views of Russian 
identity. 
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I. The Origin and Evolution of the Gopnik 
 
By looking at the societal turmoil of the late-/post-Soviet epoch through the lens of critical 
and gender theories, we can see clear trends and motives. This chapter, in large measure, explains 
the gopnik phenomenon by applying gender theory to a relatively under-scrutinized topic revealing 
that which is hiding in plain sight. I argue that the defiant masculine gopnik identity arose in the 
post-Soviet sphere as a manifestation of the “crisis of masculinity” from the laborer’s loss of 
preeminence in the late Soviet Union. The growth of new (particularly West-inspired) identities 
during this time upset the state-constructed gender/class/political order and threatened the security 
of the Soviet ‘nation’. Groups of rapidly disenfranchised suburban or provincial6 youth bonded 
over this shared loss of economic / political benefits and sought to reassert a Russo-Soviet 
masculinity on other youth subcultures. This hyper-masculine identity gathered and has 
maintained cultural momentum through the assertion of distinctly Russian values and its rejection 
of the political and cultural encroachment of the West.  
 There are three main factors that led to the formation of the gopnik identity. First, the failure 
of Communist ideology and constructions of masculinity following Stagnation7 in providing 
young Russian men with a semblance of purpose and fulfillment. Second, the slow collapse of the 
Komsomol in the late 1980s, and its eventual disintegration, removed the largest controller of 
Soviet youth culture, and provider of social and economic safety net for Russia’s working class 
and problematic youth. Third, the opening of the Soviet Union’s informational gates during 
glasnost caused an overwhelming flood of Western culture and identities that were only accessible 
to a limited portion of the population. In concert, these factors created a divide between those in 
city centers that had access to fulfillment, and those that became gopniki. 
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Gender, Masculinity and the Soviet Union 
To understand where the gopniki came from, we must recognize that the phenomenon was 
a particular response to a major crisis happening in the Soviet Union. Although inextricably related 
to the economic and political turmoil of a once great empire falling apart, the gopniki also were 
responding to a Russian cultural crisis of gender, identity, and of a man’s place in a changing and 
Westernizing society.  
But what exactly is gender, and how could one claim it inspired thousands of young 
provincial Russian men to rove in packs, to beat up youth of other marginalized groups, or to squat 
in courtyards eating sunflower seeds? Briefly, it is widely accepted by theorists that ‘gender’ is 
something we do.8 We perform gender through thousands of choices, gestures, tones, actions, 
signs, and demeanors. Each of these choices are societally coded to mean anything between a and 
z. For example, a baby in America with earrings would generally be read as female, a baby wearing 
blue as male. While gender and sex are not the same thing, they are related, and in turn are related 
to sexuality – all of which exist on spectrums with many distinct points.  
Historically, people have been pushed into conforming to either male or female 
cisgenderhood, with other identities labeled as ‘deviant,’ ‘abnormal,’ or dangerous. For example, 
genders in the Soviet Union were seen as distinct categories, “communities of individuals endowed 
with specific biological and psychological characteristics occupying a particular position in 
society”.9  This bio-essentialist view strongly encouraged citizens to follow specific roles within a 
larger Soviet construction. With ever multiplying technologies of surveillance and control (such 
as the web, concepts of beauty and fitness, mass media, our peers and family), as discussed by 
Foucault, modern society has many ways to discipline bodies, pushing us to confirm into accepted 
definitions of ‘maleness’ and ‘femaleness,’ so as not to challenge the existing gender order10 that 
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structures society.11 This ‘maleness’ and ‘femaleness’ put in other terms is masculinity and 
femininity. 
Just as there are many gender constructions and gender theories, there are many 
masculinities. Key to my arguments about the gopniki’s origin are the ideas of hegemonic 
masculinity and “protest” masculinity. In Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept, 
Connell and Messerschmidt describe ‘hegemonic masculinity’ as a pattern of practices that allows 
and maintains: (1) men’s domination over women; (2) a structured hierarchy of competing 
masculinities, with the hegemon at the top.12  Hegemonic masculinity is the most honored way of 
being a man in a certain place and at a certain time, is constantly being renegotiated, and is 
embodied by very few people.13 “Protest masculinities” are those that embody the hyper-masculine 
claim to power (here meaning both physical bodily power, and also the ability to influence events) 
enjoyed by hegemons but lack the economic or institutional resources / authority to fully challenge 
it.14  To Connell, hegemony means “ascendancy achieved through culture, institutions, and 
persuasion.” In the Soviet Union the Communist Party and the Komsomol (monolithic, massively 
encompassing Soviet youth organization)15 constructed and maintained these masculine (and 
feminine) identities. However, unlike in most places before or after, ascendency was held by the 
Party and these Soviet identities were deliberately constructed to maintain the Bolshevik Party’s 
dominance over its citizens. Thus, attainment of a personal feeling of purpose, achievement or 
power was intrinsically tied to the Party – no form of identity outside Party lines was considered 
valid. Attempts to break out of the box, such as those by the stiliagi after WWII, were inevitably 
quashed. Proper masculinity was a core part of Soviet identity propaganda. 
In the place of “naturally”16 formed hegemonic masculinity and emphasized femininity (see 
below), the Bolshevik theorist of the early Soviet Union created a model of the New Soviet Man 
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and New Soviet Woman for citizens to aspire. Many of the characteristics of the New Soviet Man 
are also embodied in what you may picture in a hegemon – hard working, strong leadership, 
exquisite care of the body, and a sharp mind. However, the New Soviet Person unselfishly 
dedicated themselves to the collective and a Communist future.  
During Stalin’s reign, two main identities were forged that could be said to represent, 
according to Zdravomyslova and Temkina, a “hegemonic Soviet masculinity” – the Stakhanovite 
worker,17 and the war hero.18 Both sacrificed all – a personal life, their family life, and sometimes 
their own life – selflessly for the State, its industrialization, and its defense from the encircling 
capitalists and fascists. Of these, the Stakhanovite was the most accessible. Any man (or woman) 
who worked hard enough, dedicated themselves to labor, the collective, and the Communist cause 
could achieve national renown and rewards (such as a car, a chance to meet the General Secretary, 
a new apartment). For much of the Union’s existence, the simple yet principled working man (in 
theory if not in praxis) was valued over the highly educated intelligentsia, as he contributed more 
directly to Bolshevism’s central tenants.  
While these “hegemonic” identities certainly relied on patriarchal constructs of male power 
and the need to protect the women at home, they were, in practice, slightly ungendered. For 
example: women served in the military in various capacities, held jobs, and attended the 
maintenance of the state rather than the maintenance of patriarchy. Further, the above identities 
were quite static and as the terms and conditions of Soviet life changed, the most honored way to 
be a citizen, for men, was hardly renegotiated. Compounding this, the economy of the late Soviet 
Union was one of long-term stagnation rather than rapid industrialization, and there were no longer 
wars of popular nor ideological meaning to which one would want to give their life. By the late 
1980s, it was nearly impossible for Soviet men to achieve the vaunted hegemonic male status that 
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was available to their fathers, nor did it mean anywhere near as much if they did. Soviet “manhood” 
was weak and under threat. 
Masculinity in Crisis 
The widespread malaise among men in the Soviet Union spanning the 1980s to early 1990s 
came to be known as a “crisis of masculinity.”19 This crisis had several origins and very real effects 
on the direction of the Union. First, as detailed above, Soviet men felt stifled by the prescribed 
definitions of masculinity: the soul of the masses had long grown weary of an ideology that had 
not brought about major upgrades in quality of life in a long time. Stagnation and the strengthening 
of the Party State under Stalin had not only sapped people’s enthusiasm about the Communist 
cause but turned obedience to the Party into a ritualistic afterthought. By the 1980s, the Soviet 
ideal’s lack of a “positive evaluation of autonomy and private values,” chafed rather than 
inspired.20 Instead of a plethora of “New Soviet Men,” the USSR was inundated by the maligned 
homo sovieticus. 
Homo sovieticus was the “antihero” of the Soviet ideal, who “lacks ambition or respect for 
work, is blindly obedient to the party and takes advantage of collective labor, and drinks heavily 
to cope with his feelings of impotence,” finding himself the butt of many anekdoty (jokes).21  The 
weakness of this prominent figure of late Soviet society strengthened people’s doubt in 
Communism. Neither could the Soviet man prove himself by fulfilling masculine roles defined in 
Communism, nor could he (most importantly and a source of much angst) fulfill “traditional” 
masculine roles such as owning property, political expression, and being the sole breadwinner; the 
latter being just the tip of deeper gender problems in the USSR.  This late Soviet man was 
repeatedly infantilized and emasculated, yet could not seem to do anything to change that narrative. 
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Compounding men’s “crisis of masculinity” was the successful fulfillment of both Soviet 
and traditional masculine roles by women during this period. Created in tandem with the New 
Soviet Man was the New Soviet Women. While original constructions of Communist 
‘womanhood’ in the 20s were very radical (freedom from all domestic and childrearing duties, 
near complete gender equality, easy access to abortion and divorce, but not contraception),22 the 
New Soviet Woman was designed as a family-oriented compliment to the Man.23 This shift under 
Stalin back to a much more conservative definition of the family was greatly inspired by the 
millions of people lost to famine, war, revolution and purges throughout the 1930s and 1940s. As 
a result of the above tragedies, there was (and still is) a substantial numerical inequality (over 1 
million more women) between genders that continues to inspire pronatalist policies in Russia 
today. 
To further understand how, even in its pseudo-traditional patriarchal familial construction, 
the New Soviet Women subverts masculinity in the USSR, we must look at how it diverges from 
the ‘emphasized femininity’ of the West. Emphasized femininity is the female complement of 
hegemonic masculinity, in that it represents the “most valued” way of being a woman in a 
patriarchal society. However, where hegemonic masculinity leads to ascendency, the attainment 
of the ‘ideal feminine’ leads to further submission to patriarchal (state) constructs.24 The ideal 
Soviet woman deviated from a traditional reading of emphasized femininity in that she shared 
many characteristics with her “hegemonic” male counterpart. She, too, filled the “manly” roles of 
manual laborer, scientist, factory worker or manager, and could be recognized for her labors as a 
true Stakhanovite. By performing these acts of Soviet masculinity in a non-male body, as 
Halberstam would argue, Soviet women made their masculine power all the more “legible.”25 And 
unlike the homo sovieticus, the New Soviet Woman had an attainable, ideologically central role to 
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play – reproduction.26 Thus, women could be said to enjoy a stable place in Soviet society as partial 
breadwinners, leader of the family, and the role of “mother” as idealized by the Party.   
This does not mean that women shared, or were portrayed to share, an equal position in 
Soviet society to men. The Party promoted what Pierre Bourdieu calls ‘masculine domination,’ 
and the symbolic violence used to maintain patriarchal ascendency. In calling it a “crisis” of 
masculinity, Soviet theorists reinforce the “dehistoricization and eternalization of the structure of 
… sexual division” by saying that masculinity being in a “crisis” is unnatural; in other words, they 
are stating that society is naturally dominated by patriarchal masculine constructs.27  Bourdieu 
explains that sexual and genital difference were socially constructed to ‘naturalize’ male 
domination by seating it in biological difference between sexes.28 Therefore, the reporting of the 
“crisis of masculinity” worked to sustain the Party enforced subordination of Soviet women. 
Despite the infantilization and discrediting of the Soviet man, the lower status of women 
remained evident. One need only look at the majority men held in positions of power in 
government, the Party (e.g. Politburo), and factories to see men continued to hold a privileged 
place in all spheres of public life. Further, the priority placed on reproduction reinforced a standard 
of submission, docility and beauty that must be maintained in public and private life, softening the 
blow of the New Soviet Woman’s masculinity. Pronatalist policies also made factory managers 
reluctant to hire a woman who may take paid maternal leave, with the passing over of qualified 
candidates common. Additionally, (in conflict with aspirations for equal and independent 
coexistence of genders in the family outlined by early Bolshevik theorists) women were still 
expected to fulfill homemaking and childrearing duties29 (while men were held exempt) on top of 
their participation in the workforce, in what is known as the “double shift” or “double burden” that 
partially defined women’s experience in the USSR.30 Implicitly, women were asked to make a 
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choice between career advancement and having a happy family (child), as depicted in movies such 
as Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears (dir. Vladimir Menshov, 1980). In light of these burdens, 
Soviet women’s successful fulfillment of both civic and also ideological duties tested male 
masculinity at its weakest. That Communism seemed unable to find a “solution” to this gender 
problem was disillusioning to many unfulfilled men. 
The Komsomol Crumbles 
By the late 1980s, the policies of perestroika and glasnost had all but broken the economic 
and ideological might of the Soviet Union. Perestroika, or “restructuring”, was Gorbachev’s 
attempt to kickstart a Soviet economy and society that had long been stagnant under the reign of 
Brezhnev. In brief, perestroika consisted of modest economic reforms, nuclear disarmament and 
military retreat from Afghanistan in 1988, and the policy of glasnost.31 Perestroika is notable in 
that in its attempt to kickstart a stagnant Soviet economy, replete with industry not updated since 
the 30s, it managed to break what was still hobbling along. This ushered in the defitsit (дефицит) 
economy, long lines and general absence of goods. 
Glasnost or “openness,” meanwhile, represented an unprecedented concession of power by 
the Soviet government. Implemented in the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster to strengthen 
citizen’s trust in the party-state via much increased transparency, glasnost saw a relaxation of 
censorship, the opening of long-locked archives, deregulation of music, and a lowering of 
informational borders. Importantly, it gave Soviet youth unprecedented access to Western (rather 
than Party crafted/approved) depictions of Western culture – its music, standards of living, styles, 
and youth scenes. As Soviet youth were exposed to new lifestyles, traditional ones were 
simultaneously being tarnished. The unleashed press began denouncing and uncovering the dirty 
past of anything and everything Communist. Even the most holy aspects of the Soviet Union, such 
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as Lenin and the Komsomol, were disparaged. It is one thing to have a country that improved your 
life and benefited you internally vilified, but for youth who never experienced the USSR’s 
miraculous growth, never lived through the Great Patriotic War, never saw it go toe-to-toe with 
another superpower, it must have been the final straw in their belief in a country that could not 
provide them with a hopeful present or tangible future.  
For Soviet Youth, life had not “become better” nor “more cheerful” and they began to look 
externally for ways of life and meaning.32 Western music, clothing, movies were unprecedentedly 
accessible. Major urban areas saw an explosion of “informals” (neformaly) and “tusovki”33 (Figure 
1) organized around music, economics, politics, literature, bodybuilding, black market activities.34  
These new avenues provided youth with an escape from the realities of an inert and decaying state. 
This was a major threat to the future of the Soviet Union in that youth were forming identities 
outside the ideological confines and control of the state/Komsomol. 
While it is widely noted that schools are a place for the surveillance and enforcement of 
masculinity and femininity, and the reproduction of the nation,35 in the Soviet Union much of that 
work was done by the Komsomol and its feeder youth organizations.36  Formed in 1918 for youth 
Figure 1: Neformaly of Moscow in early 90s. Adapted from Hilary Pilkington, Russia’s Youth and 
Its Culture. 
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ages 14-28, the Komsomol became an essential part of indoctrination, job training, education and 
introduction into the work force. The organization’s affirmative action potential cannot be 
overstressed, with hundreds of thousands of rural and poor youth using it as a gateway into higher 
education and the public sphere previously barred from them. Historically, the Komsomol was a 
key location for reproducing the Ideal Soviet – the class-conscious, selfless, and collectively 
committed citizen discussed above. Indeed, the allure of being able to reconstruct the self under 
Communism was one of its greatest draws during its early years,37 and the Komsomol was a nexus 
of peer-review, criticism, and self-effacement – all necessary for control of the youth population 
and the instilment of ideologically charged definitions of masculinity and femininity. “Youth” held 
a vaunted place in Soviet symbolism. They were enshrined as the “constructors of Communism,” 
thus, strong control was vital.38  Furthermore, they were seen as the link between the Union’s 
revolutionary past and its bright future, with the Komsomol forming the ideological keystone of 
that temporal bridge.39  For much of the USSR’s existence, all of the above gave participation in 
the Komsomol true ideological and self-empowering meaning. 
It is important to emphasize that the Komsomol was for all intents and purposes the only 
youth organization in the Soviet Union. The authoritative figure on youth policy and programs, it 
had a bureaucracy that mirrored the state’s, and registered as its members much of Soviet youth. 
For the state, it was extremely important in its attempts to implant itself within the Soviet family. 
A comparison to any American youth organization must inevitably understate the Komsomol’s 
import. One must imagine that all American youth, starting at the age of six, enter a “Scout” 
system, without alternative, with all of its propaganda but with a closer connection to the state; 
that all summer camps, internships, community service opportunities, recreational halls are 
facilitated by this Scout system; that the Scout system deliberately and systematically eliminated 
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any competing youth organization, no matter its benefit, to maintain a monopoly.40 This was the 
scope of the Komsomol’s role and influence for much of its existence. Therefore, a threat to the 
Komsomol was credibly a threat to the continuation of the Soviet Union. 
However, as time passed, the financial and political benefits of Komsomol membership 
declined, ideology decreased, and institutional buy-in waned throughout “stagnation.” Soviet 
youth found the institution stale, ritualistic and lacking in the opportunities they cared about.41  
Even so, the Komsomol remained the only youth organization with no formally funded alternative. 
By the late 1980s the Komsomol leadership was woefully out of touch with the youth it served, 
with Gorbachev admitting that “the masses of young people are moving on one side of the street 
and their [Komsomol] leaders are moving on the other and, furthermore, in the opposite 
direction.”42  Youth had long decided that the Komsomol could only provide them with a homo 
sovieticus future, and that fulfillment lay outside state constructs.  Despite attempts at reform, the 
damage to the Komsomol was permanent and it was disbanded in 1991.  
A “Neformal” Challenge to the Soviet Nation 
The demise of the Komsomol amounted to a crisis as impactful as the “crisis of 
masculinity” that hastened it. This becomes clear when one looks at the impact of the Komsomol’s 
failure on a Soviet “nation.” The Komsomol was a major unifying aspect of the Soviet national 
family and vital for the promotion of its culture. It was a major locus of the state’s injection into 
family life, and its phasing out destabilized the Soviet “national” project. 
Patricia Hill Collins’ theory of nationhood helps describe the impact of this on the “nation.” 
In It’s All in the Family, Collins argues that a nation’s ideation of the “ideal family” and “family 
values” help sustain the state and naturalize its inequalities, hierarchies and power structures. 
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Further, in the US the family itself is not “organized around a biological core, but a state 
sanctioned, heterosexual marriage”– the key point here being that the state and the idea of family 
are symbiotically reifying.43  The idealized family structure naturalizes external hierarchy by 
mapping familial age and gender order to structures of race, class, privilege. For example, 
structurally underprivileged groups are frequently equated to children by oppressors, with the 
oppressors envisioning themselves as needed rational parent figure that guides the immature and 
infantile. The domination of the husband over the wife in patriarchal constructs naturalizes 
patriarchal gender order in society.  
 In the USSR, the “ideal family” went through several carefully constructed phases of 
transformation. It is important to remember that at the time of the revolution, and for many years 
after, the former land of the Russian Empire was occupied overwhelmingly by peasants. While the 
rather communal nature of the Russian peasant family aligned well with Communist sentiments, 
its abundance of “non-productive work” (household task that take up a large portion of women’s 
days), absence of state ties aside from male conscription, and low levels of education were seen as 
backwards and not conducive to a forward-looking industrial country. In response, Bolshevik Party 
members theorized and implemented several radical changes to the idea of the family. From 
“releasing winged-Eros” and (briefly) decriminalizing homosexuality,44 to collectivizing all 
household and child-rearing responsibilities, to aiming for the “withering away of the family” 
(alongside the state) in favor of loving unions between energized class-conscious workers, the 
“vanguard party” looked to revolutionize the very foundations of family-hood, and, having 
uprooted its traditional property and church based bonds, plant modernity and communism.45   
While these revolutionary beginnings were eventually pegged back, the glue used to piece 
back together the denuclearized family was the ever-increasing presence of the state. Under Stalin, 
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the internal hierarchies of the family were not the “traditional” dualities of husband→wife or 
parents→children, but rather state→(wife/husband)↔youth. The party sat at your dinner table and 
listened to what you said, the state provided you with employment and housing, your true “father” 
was Stalin, the vozhd, “Father of Nations” and provider of a “Happy Childhood!” The continuation 
of the state’s place in the family was secured through its role in child rearing. In the place of the 
mother in a peasant household, the state took charge of the educational and moral upbringing of 
youth. In Lenin’s words, it was “the task of the [Komsomol] to … train Communists” and “imbue 
them with communist ethics;” in return, youth brought the party and their “communist ethics” back 
into the family.46  
Throughout Stalinism, youth were encouraged to inform on their family members, and 
while this extreme form of state intrusion withered away under Brezhnev and Khrushchev (the 
boom in independent apartments helped this too), the state continued to hold a dictatorial place in 
family life. Thus, the Soviet family naturalized state power and intrusion into daily life while 
requiring participation in Communist life to reproduce proper ethics and values. It drilled in 
hierarchies of party→state→citizenry, productive worker→idle materialist, Komsomol/Party 
member→average comrade. 
When youth started abandoning long held communist identities for West-inspired ones 
during perestroika, it not only threatened the reproduction of Soviet culture and politics, it also 
threatened the above hierarchies built into Soviet society. While these shifts did not endanger the 
position of those in power, it did upset the many members of the working class who derived 
prestige and meaning from the labor-oriented Bolshevik system. The Party and the Komsomol had 
always been a source of upward mobility and reward for workers, and as those institutions 
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crumbled so did the services for working youth (such as recreational facilities, job training 
programs), pushing them to search for solutions outside the confines of the state.  
Urban youth with connections, on the other hand, were thriving under the relaxation of 
cultural controls. Rather than attending rallies or brigades, Komsomol age youth in Moscow were 
dancing to Western music at cafes, reading poetry in Pushkin square, or going to concerts by the 
many new Russian rock bands.47 New identities centered on musicians or genres, styles of dress, 
or particular lifestyles were at the core of the neformaly explosion.  Many of these identities were 
inherently materialistic and created a division between those with access and those without.48  
Naturally, those living in city centers – the children of apparatchiki, factory managers, professors 
– had such access and proximity to goods and cultural events, whereas those living in the suburbs 
did not.  That many of these groups were male dominated (aside from some of the music-oriented 
groups) was not coincidental, the yearning for peremen49 in the ways youth could express their 
masculinity was strong. These were purposeful responses to the masculine malaise they saw 
around them. New hierarchies, inaccessible to most working youth, were being formed around 
which lifestyles were the coolest, which groups listened to the best music, dressed the best, had 
the most attractive women. Entrenched in those group hierarchies were hierarchies of the 
masculinities they embodied – there were the gentle metropolitan stiliagi, the anti-societal punks, 
the business oriented black marketeers, and, at the top of it all, the hyper-masculine bikers.50   
To working and rural youth this was a violent disruption of the Soviet “family” built up 
and reinforced over the past 70 years. This necessitated, to some, a similarly violent response to 
protect that “family.” Suburban youth felt unfairly left behind by a rapidly material society that no 
longer valued Bolshevik tenants of hard work, the collective good, and deference to the Party. This 
tumultuous period saw the rise of suburban youth who figured themselves the protectors of 
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Russia’s true interests, as the vanguard against Western influence and decadence, the defenders of 
Communist values: these youth would eventually be called gopniki. Although more powerless than 
ever to impact their world, the gopniki built a cultural edifice that would bring back an illusory 
feeling of hegemonic masculinity and a better Soviet past. This edifice is described further, as the 
real’nyi patsan.  
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II. The Essence of a Real Patsan 
 
Having explored the emasculated origins of the gopniki, it is now helpful to describe the 
“gop-culture” so that we can better understand its influence on society. The truth behind gopnik 
youth is covered in depth by few Russian sources, and virtually no English ones. Thus, to 
understand how the gopniki have affected Russian culture, and why they are popular in 2020, a 
deep understanding of gopnik culture and practices is imperative. 
 The first thing one must understand about the gopnik, is that it is a character of paradoxes. 
They are seen as uncultured, yet have helped create a memorable niche of Russian culture. They 
are referred to as gopniki by all but themselves. They are one of the most recognizable depictions 
of “Russianness” outside Russia today, yet are hardly seen in the country itself anymore. Their 
actions were extreme(ist), and yet the views they held are now extremely mainstream. During the 
90s they were possibly the largest “sub-culture” in Russia, yet could hardly be described as a 
subculture at all.  
Even working with source material, there are so many complications and contradictions 
about who the gopniki actually were. This chapter is part history, part anecdote, and part theory. 
First, a focus on the etymology of the word “gopnik” reveals the history of the two waves of gopnik 
prominence in Russia, and the story of the USSR’s problematic youth. Learning of their 
socioeconomic and geographic origins leads to the next section, exploring the characteristics of 
gopniki. Finally, we examine where the gopniki went and address questions about their cultural 
status. Ultimately, this chapter helps tie together the reasons for their emergence with the reasons 
for their lasting influence, highlighting their disdain for a changing and westernizing world that 
was moving away from their traditional Russian masculine identity. 
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Gopnik: What Does That Mean? 
The etymology of the word “gopnik” requires a historical examination of the two waves of 
gopnik prominence in Russia. The gopniki of the 90s largely came from the suburbs of large cities, 
or from the surrounding countryside. Viewed as coarse and primitive, they always traveled in 
groups patrolling their territory, beating up those who got on their nerves and committing petty 
robbery. These teens were ubiquitous throughout the early part of the decade, and seemingly came 
out of nowhere. As one source related: 
We encountered them in courtyards, at bus stops, in underground passages. Over time, 
the name [gopnik] of the most widespread subculture [sic] became a commonplace 
[epithet]. The person swearing on the marshrutka – gopnik. The guy who didn’t throw 
his cigarette in the ash tray – gopnik. Who drank on the street and loudly made fun of 
passerby – gopnik. (Evgenii Mori)51 
These negative connotations have stuck with the name, with gopnik now being used in reference 
to any “poorly raised” miscreant or brute one encounters, rather than an actual gopnik. This 
negative reputation has led some to theorize that “gopnik” comes from the slang “gop-stop” (гоп-
стоп) or the verb “gopat'” (гопать), both being prison slang for robbery.52 The uncertain root of 
the word stems from the sudden appearance of gopniki on the streets out of seemingly nowhere in 
the late 1980s, with the term appearing at the same time. However, the 1990s were not the first 
time “gopniki” invaded Russia’s cities, and thus I believe the origin of the word is found further 
back in time.  
The 1920s were also a time of crisis in the Soviet Union, and post-revolution Russia saw 
an explosion of uncontrolled youth. Many sources refer to the Gosudarstvennyi obshchezhitie 
proletariata, the “State dormitory of the proletariat,” or G.O.P. – a communal tenement for street 
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children, orphans and homeless youth – as an origin for the name.53 Specifically, the G.O.P. was a 
converted hotel on Ligovskii Prospekt opened in 1920s Petrograd (St. Petersburg) for the countless 
youth flooding into Communist Russia’s major cities in search of work.54 The prevalence in the 
surrounding neighborhood of these young people led the neighbors to add the Russian suffix “-
nik” (the equivalent of “-ist” or “-er”)  to “gop” to create “gopnik” as a way to refer to them.55  
 Unfortunately, the youth of Ligovskii Prospekt were not unique to the early Soviet Union. 
Between 1917 and 1922 the number of orphans and abandoned children throughout the Union 
increased from 30 thousand to around 4 million.56 According to the 1897 Imperial Census, around 
¾ of the population of Imperial Russia were peasants, 57 and unaccompanied children flooded in 
from the countryside following the revolution. The Civil War and ensuing famines devastated the 
countryside, prompting people of all ages to flee to major cities. There was little ability to feed 
extra mouths, and many minors made the trek towards centers of opportunity. The Soviet 
orphanage system was quickly overwhelmed and in major cities youth homelessness and street life 
skyrocketed. As Catriona Kelly notes in her excellent study of childhood in the USSR, the early 
“liberalness” of orphanage administration, and frequent “open door” policies helped foster a 
criminal street youth culture among waifs in cities.58 During this period, street children were 
generally seen in a generous light as pitiable, innocent and crafty (an example of this depiction can 
be found in Ilf and Petrov’s famous comedy 12 Chairs) rather than criminal and a scourge on 
society. Nonetheless, gang ethos was very prevalent among waifs, with groups forming strict 
hierarchies and generating a waif folklore that romanticized transgression.59 Making matters 
worse, “morally defective” orphans were frequently grouped together in homes, solidifying 
pseudo-criminal networks.60 A preponderance of crime during the early Soviet period was 
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committed by youth – thievery, prostitution, street-trading, gambling – and the government 
eventually changed its liberal attitude towards problematic youth. 
 By 1926 sentiments about the orphan population were shifting from the early liberal 
policies to more draconian measures. Stricter regulations on how orphanages should be run were 
implemented, and there was a general push to remove the eye-sore of waifs from public view.61 
Orphans and the homeless were not the only children affected by these changes, as the growing 
number of unattended kids from proletarian families entered street culture. In Soviet society, with 
both parents working full-time jobs, especially in working class families employed at factories, 
children would find large portions of their day outside of school without an adult to watch over 
them and regulate their activity.62 To cut down on unmitigated youth crime, the age of being tried 
as an adult was lowered significantly, and the penal system started to be used to remove “morally 
defective” children from orphanages and the streets. By 1935 street kids were often seen as 
potential criminals, whose guiltiness was assumed. Rather than being shuffled around orphanages, 
problem children were frequently tried in court and sent to penal colonies with other criminals and 
“enemies of the state.”63 Fortunately, by the end of the Stalinist period, and certainly after his death, 
punitive measures were generally relaxed. In their stead, orphans and problem children were 
generally put into technical schools (PTUs, FZUs), factory schools, and other trade schools to push 
them into the workforce and hopefully rehabilitate them into Communist society.64 This tactic 
remained generally unchanged throughout the rest of the USSR’s existence, and these technical 
schools were frequent breeding grounds for the types of “hooliganistic” youth that became gopniki. 
 When Gorbachev came to power in 1985, the country was again entering a period of 
turmoil. For the reasons described in the previous chapter, youth were experimenting with new 
identities that deviated from the Party line. Although connected youth in city centers were able to 
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spin this into music or style-based subcultures, youth in the suburbs and provincial areas were 
largely left out. Without recreational options nor organizations that could continue to provide for 
them, maligned youth found other ways to spend their time. The disenfranchised suburban youth 
that began to emerge during this period became the second generation of “gopniki,” like those 
from 1920s Petrograd, to sweep through the nation. 
 The first of these proto-gopnik youth groups to thrust itself into the spotlight were the 
“liubera” or “liubery” of Moscow. Hailing from the proletarian suburb of Liubertsy, they would 
frequently travel into Moscow proper in attempts to claim space and beat up members of those 
neformaly that offended them.65 The culture valued shows of strength, purity, boxing, karate – the 
upholding of an anti-Western pseudo-proletarian hyper-masculinity showcased through their 
simple, clean dress and heavily muscled bodies. During this time underground gyms formed across 
Figure 2: A group of liubery in an underground gym. The boy’s shirt says "Liubertsy" the suburb they 
come from. 
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the country in numbers, with kachki, amateur bodybuilders, a staple across more provincial cities 
and suburbs, and a central part of the liuber identity. Local groups formed territorially around these 
gyms or specific courtyards solidified the importance of group cohesion and brotherhood to the 
liubera, and later gopnik, identity. However, it is important to note that there are several factors 
that set liubera apart from the gopniki. Unlike with gopniki, liubera had a concrete philosophy, a 
credo of sorts that motivated their actions, style of dress, and physical activity. Liubera also had a 
structure of communication between groups with a distinct leadership, rather than simple 
geographically oriented hierarchies. It is also interesting to note the relatively high participation of 
girls in the liuber movement in comparison to their complete absence amongst gopniki. These 
women would also participate in liuber actions, attired in old-fashioned and unstylish Soviet 
dress.66 
 Although metropolitan youth saw liubera as uncultured and provincial, liubera themselves 
saw Westernizing youth as traitors to their own country, and themselves as its protectors. Liuber 
views on this matter were influenced by the large number of veterans returning from Afghanistan 
at the time who were outraged by the masses of Western loving youth.67 While later gopniki 
inherited their dislike for neformaly, the liubera were distinct in their aspects of ideology and 
commitment to their, albeit slightly extreme, moral compass. They frequently got in fights with 
hippies, punks, stiliagi, and would steal the sub-cultural trinkets off members of urban subcultures, 
yet lacked the materialistic impulses of later gopniki to use the petty crime as a means for self-
enrichment that was showcased by the more violent and crime affiliated ur-gopniki of Kazan.68 
Their pseudo-puritanism extended to an anti-drug stance and a general temperance when it came 
to alcohol and substances that would be detrimental to the proletarian body. The final note of 
importance about the liubera was that they rose in infamy alongside increasing nationalism in 
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Russia. Although the press sensationalized the violent impact of their activities, many saw their 
actions as patriotic and just. A key inheritance of the gopniki from the liubera was the blind eye 
the police frequently showed to their violence. With the Komsomol no longer running youth 
brigades, liubera took it upon themselves to conduct what they saw as their duty to break up groups 
whose message weakened Communist/Russian national unity. Even as the liuber movement faded, 
giving way to the gopniki of the 1990s, the tradition of protecting nash, ours, while beating up 
anybody ne nash, not ours/us held as a central tenant of gopnikism. 
The Semiotics of Squatting Slavs 
After Putin, vodka, bears, onion-domes, and the hammer and sickle, one of the most 
recognizable Russian images is that of the squatting, Adidas-wearing gopnik. The stereotypical 
look: shaved-headed youth squatting in a dvor, drinking and smoking, spitting sunflower seeds, 
decked out in tracksuits or leather jackets, newsboy caps, pointy leather shoes or adidas. Inside 
Russia itself their brutish manners of speaking and provocative phrases are feared and parodied in 
equal measure by city-dwellers. Their ubiquity led to gopnik becoming a negative epithet even 
after they all but vanished. 
 When the liubera and gopniki first emerged, their unfashionable proletarian look stood out 
against their classmates who conformed to western styles. While the leather jacket was common, 
the classic image of the gopnik captures them wearing their adidas trackie.69 Introduced to the 
Soviet Union during the 1980 Moscow Olympics when the German sportswear company provided 
the kits for the host nation, the Adidas tracksuit became a coveted yet exceptionally rare item 
before the transition to capitalism. As Pilkington relates, in 1988 gopniki were still associated with 
Soviet tracksuits and outerwear.70 The choice of tracksuit possibly has its roots in their comfort, 
sportiness and working-class nature that was worn in the gym and on the street. Another staple of 
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the gopnik look is the newsboy cap. This piece harkens back to the days of the original gopniki 
and symbolizes the general gopnik sentiment of returning Russia to a mythical greater past. 
Squatting, meanwhile, has its roots in Russian prison / gulag culture – places to sit outside were 
infrequent or non-existent in the labor camps, and rather than sit on the cold ground, inmates 
elected to squat. This tradition was passed onto youth who would squat (always with their heels 
on the ground) in their shared courtyards to hang with friends, drink cheap alcohol, eat sunflower 
seeds and smoke cigarettes.71 The consumption of sunflower seeds, or rather the process of 
cracking and spitting the shells onto the ground was a particularly important tradition. 
Symbolically, the act of spitting the shells around them showed their disdain for good manners 
and the constraints of urban society. Additionally, the sunflower seed itself is generally associated 
with peasant and proletarian culture in Russia and solidifies the gopnik connection to tradition. 
 Even though the gopnik is best known for their style outside of Eastern Europe, within 
Russia they are probably best remembered for their actions. For example, many recall their 
aggressive and potentially dangerous encounters that one must learn to avoid.72 While known to 
especially target those who stood out, gopniki would also harass or provoke a passerby in search 
of conflict or personal gain. One respondent in Valentin Golovin and Mikhail Lurie’s study 
describes gopniki as “[if] a simple dude is walking by – they [gopniki] run up to him, yeah, beat 
him up, steal something from him. That’s [the type of people] gopniki [are].”73 However, most 
sources note that gopniki do not unilaterally provoke conflict – some citing that the gopnik code 
of honor requires a reason for every fight.74 Some examples of verbal provocation include asking 
if a passerby has “a couple rubles” or “a light” on them,75 cursing, calling people over, or generally 
insulting them.76 Unlike the liubera the came before them, gopnik thievery is widely 
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acknowledged, including by their members, as mostly motivated by self-enrichment – even 
theft/battery of punks and neformaly members.77  
Another integral note about gopniki is that they always traveled, operated, and acted in 
packs. The fact that they are almost exclusively referred to in the plural (“-i”) reinforces this. 
Rather than emphasizing individuality, gopnik culture stresses group cohesion and conformity. 
The collective’s opinion matters the most, and any action must be approved by all. Any feat of 
strength, manliness, bravery meant nothing unless it was observed by another group member. The 
groups themselves were very territorial in nature, forming around a specific dvor, block, or mini 
neighborhood. Among gopniki there is no official nor standardized hierarchy, but deference was 
typically given to members who have been with the group longer.78 It is widely recognized that 
while gopniki have no written code, they lead their lives «по понятиям», by following the 
criminal/prison code.79 Criminal/prison culture, while not directly tied to gopnikism, had large 
Figure 3: Some older gopniki cracking sunflower seeds. 
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effects on how they dressed, interacted, and spoke. The introduction of much prison slang and 
ways of speaking, much of which is not suitable to be printed here, to the general public came 
about via gopniki.80 Their foul language, impatient aggressive attitude, and overall thuggery helped 
lend the word gopnik its negative connotation. 
 Possibly more interesting than how gopniki were viewed by others, is how they viewed 
themselves. Unlike almost any other youth movement or subculture they never referred to 
themselves as gopniki. Rather, they always said they were just “normal lads” (normal’nye 
patsany).81 The choice of patsan as the term of self-identification is interesting in itself,82 but far 
more telling about their worldview is their choice of “normal” and what they mean by it. It is 
apparent that “normal” here does not mean “like the majority;” even the dullest patsan realizes 
most people do not act like him. Rather, gopniki are asserting that they lead their lives the proper 
way, that they should be considered what makes someone a proper man. The very core of the 
gopnik worldview is the proclamation of their superior masculinity. A proper man should, like 
them, “always be ready to fight” and assert their physical dominance over those who think 
themselves better.83 The proper man should focus on building their physical strength, showing off 
their bravery, and acquiring a beautiful woman.  
Part of their anger at those neformaly who sit above them in the social ladder (in other 
words, all of them), is that “they/the other,” ne nash, chuzhie, those who are not properly Rus, are 
succeeding while “ours,” nash, the true Russians live on the periphery of social, cultural, and 
financial life. Quoting Pilkington, this insecurity that they will always be on the margins, always 
on the periphery, drives the gopnik “desire to acquire and adopt the outdoor trappings of urban life 
[not just the look, the cash, the car, but most importantly the physical space itself, the sense that 
you belong in the city -EL], without the [accompanying] spiritual values” that their affluent 
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westernized counterparts have adopted.84 What is paradoxical here, is that gopniki cede that the 
urban is the pinnacle of society, that their way of life, imported to the edges of the city from the 
countryside, is still superior and more Russian. 
 Upon a closer look, the country roots of gopnikism are apparent and form their views on 
masculinity. According to Sergei Ushakin, “swearing, drinking, smoking, talking with women, 
participation in fist fights with other boys, organizing hooliganistic pranks and tricks on your 
neighbors… - all of this were considered a part of raising sons” in the countryside.85 While the 
material conditions of the Russian countryside improved somewhat between the 19th- and 21st-
centuries, many of the traditions and sentiments have remained the same. For example, the 
importance of group action and fighting to gopniki remained a normal part of childhood in Russian 
villages and towns, as noted by Golovin and Lurie. They report that in small towns, feuds between 
“territorial” youth groups have been passed down for generations, with the tradition of large-scale 
fights stretching back at least to the 1800s.86 A matter of note from their study was the lack of 
gopniki in the countryside, instead, the main tenants of what made you a “normal patsan” in the 
city were simply a part of normal life in the countryside. Titillatingly, the conditions that push 
gopniki to socialize as they do in city suburbs (lack of resources, places of congregation, activities) 
are commonplace in the countryside, with few, if any, stores catering to subcultural needs and 
styles. Additionally, the lack of critical mass means that only one or two subcultures can really 
survive in most towns, and that many of their participants would be accused by urbanites of 
“gopnikism.”87 
Gopnik as an Expression of Crisis Response 
Knowing the origin of gopniki, we can address a final question: what exactly were the 
gopniki – a subculture, movement, worldview, or common street gang culture? Their 
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impermanence makes the latter unlikely, as while styles change, the entire way of life has all but 
vanished 20 years into Putin’s reign.88 It is also hard to call them a movement as there was no 
national, or even local, organization nor official structure. As for subculture, while they did have 
their preferred ways of dressing and speaking, they had no overarching ideology, and unlike most 
any subculture in existence, rather than emphasizing (verbally) their distance or superiority 
from/over the norm, they vehemently state that they are norm-al. Further, most subcultures have 
some sort of overarching code, organizing structure, or affinity network – the gopniki had none of 
these. There was no local or national coordination between gopnik groups, no shared music tastes, 
and no written manifesto. The same reasons make it hard to place them under the more 
encompassing Russian word for community (soobshchestvo).89 Gavriliuk claims gopnikism to be 
mostly a worldview, but I would argue this is a slightly limited understanding.90  
It is true that their position and view of the world set them apart from other youth at the 
time, and that those two factors were a major part of what bound one gopnik group to another, but 
that does not explain why they disappeared. Considering that more people share their views on 
patriarchy, manliness, nationalism, and xenophobia now than at any point during the 90s, their 
absence is somewhat shocking if you constrain their previous prevalence as a shared worldview. 
However, if one acknowledges the economic and political turmoil of the 90s, and the ensuing 
stability of the Putin years, the possibility of gopnikism as a technique of crisis response cannot be 
ignored. Indeed, that the two peaks of gopnik prominence were during the 1920s and 1990s, the 
two most traumatically transitory periods in modern Russian history, cannot be ignored. Thus, in 
my opinion, the gopnik was a mechanism to cope with one’s whole life being uprooted. Thrust 
from a country way of life to the inequality of the city, the gopnik view was a way to assert and 
preserve the self in a time of major change. 
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The next chapter examines how the gopnik image affected and continues to influence 
Russian culture. It is these modern depictions of the gopnik, created after their actual prevalence 
that first acquainted me with the group, and sparked my interest in unraveling the questions their 
existence raised. Their actions and mannerisms have sparked both mockery and cult-like status, 
and a lasting cultural influence that goes beyond your general “only 90s kids would understand” 
type fads. Looking at their expression through multiple forms of media will help us understand 
what made the “technique” so ubiquitous and successful, and how similar movements have gained 
traction throughout the world.  
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III. Squatting Slavs in Tracksuits: The Lasting Impact 
of Gopniki on Post-Soviet Russian Culture 
 
This project would be incomplete without presenting the cultural (re)productions of the 
gopniki that initially sparked my interest in them, and without which this study would never have 
been written. I refer, of course, to the “squatting Slav” genre of memes. As will be shown, the 
gopnik has lasting cultural relevance through many forms of media, the most prevalent of which 
happens to be the meme. This chapter explores why the image of the gopnik has prevailed over the 
past 20 years while the physical embodiment of the gopnik identity has not. I will look at both 
culture that they inspired – such as music and fashion – and forms of culture that have helped 
construct how they are viewed today, such as film and memes. 
 Before looking at more classical forms of media and representation, study of the gopnik as 
meme is surprisingly informative. Tropes that are found across other “art-forms” about the gopnik 
are neatly synthesized here – stereotypes, truths and falsities are coalesced into a general “squatting 
Slav” image that has infested the Russian internet since at least 2010.91 Certainly, the gopnik as 
meme has been the most widespread representation of the identity, and, in fact, one of the most 
successful (consumption-wise) representations of “Slav-ness” off of the Runet (Russian-speaking 
internet; a neologism from the “.ru” address and internet) in the 2010s. Immediate proof of this is 
that a search for “Slav” in any popular search engine will present images exclusively of gopniki. 
On a personal note, it was these memes, particularly from the popular Facebook page “Squatting 
Slavs in Tracksuits,” that first introduced me to gopniki and started my fascination with them. As 
more and more Russians (and Eastern Europeans) entered the international web, the “squatting 
Slav” meme rose to higher prominence with people “cosplaying” as gopniki in as far-ranging 
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locales as Brazil and South Korea.92 The success of the meme is undeniable, and although it seems 
to have passed its peak (approximately 2015-2018) it is certainly still common and can be credited 
with preserving and popularizing the gopnik in the past decade. That raises the question of what 
makes the “squatting Slav” as successful an image as it is, especially considering that the memes 
are frequently devoid of text, only requiring the image and some background knowledge to enjoy. 
 This feat can partially be ascribed to the nature of “memes” and this meme’s origins. To 
review, the Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines a meme as “an idea, behavior, style, or usage that 
spreads from person to person within a culture” virally, frequently undergoing mutations, 
specifications and improvements.93 The ease with which members of the internet community and 
creators can engage with the gopnik identity and spread it has made it singularly successful at 
maintaining the gopnik’s influence on Russian culture and outsider understandings of Russian-
ness. However, the second facet mentioned above, the origin of the “squatting Slav” meme, is 
more telling and ultimately interesting.  
Unlike many other memes of “Russian-ness” or “Slav-ness” that are created by outsiders 
mocking those in, the “squatting Slav” and gopnik as a meme was largely created by Slavs, for 
other Slavs, about the particular type of Slav that is the gopnik.94 According to Tikhomirov, the 
gopnik image seen today (rather than factual, non-memetic depictions) was formed on the Runet 
by “creatives” as a strategy to solidify what made “us – normal youth”, what designated someone 
as a typical metropolitan (global) youth; the answer that these “creatives” (non-professional artists, 
bloggers, writers, general teens on the internet) came up with was “not gopniki.”95 In other words, 
the bygone gopnik of the 90s was sculpted into the boogieman of contemporary Russian society to 
signify not-normal, dislikable, maligned youth. Tikhomirov, writing in 2011 continues, saying 
that: 
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The astounding popularity of [the gopnik] image is evidenced in a quote from Ya. Levin 
and M. Ames: “If you were to believe the Russian blogosphere, it would seem that the 
Gopnik is so ubiquitous in Russia […] that they are flooding over the borders [….] sites 
mock and ridicule Russian gopniki with such zeal [r’iano] that it passes as praise [uzhe 
perekhodit v slavoslovie]”.96 As one of our respondents noted, “no other subculture 
[subkul’tura] has as many creatives dedicated to it: films, songs, poems, collages; no 
other [group] has become such a popular object of universal hatred [as the gopniki]” 
(male, born in 1990). 156 
The Levin and Ames quote is particularly interesting for several reasons: its time of writing, the 
focus on Russian gopniki, and its insight into the almost praising nature of Russian bloggers’ 
hatred. First, Levin and Ames were writing in 2007, a time when internet penetration in Russia 
was only 25% (compared to 75% in the US. Note that Russia’s penetration was, and is, still higher 
than other former Soviet countries’ excluding the Baltic states) – a fraction of Russia’s urban 
population and constrained to those living in major cities at that.97 Thus, the early formative 
narrative about the gopnik was fervently constructed on the Runet by youth with means, with little 
to no input by the rapidly dwindling current, or even former gopniki. Mocking images, videos, 
texts were gathered on now defunct sites with names like “yagopnik.ru”, “gopnic.ru”, 
“gopniki.net” that tongue-in-cheekily catered to real’nyje patsany.98  
 As more of the post-Soviet world came online, these mocking memes of remnants from 
the 90s spread from the Runet to other Slavic countries interested in sharing depictions of their 
own “gopniki.” And indeed, the gopnik as a Slavic phenomenon was not unique to Russia. All 
formerly communist countries of the Eastern Bloc experienced some sort of decline leading up to, 
and crisis following the transition to capitalism and privatization. All had significant proletarian 
populations in decaying suburban sprawls that saw their worth and opportunities vanish in the free 
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market. Each had booming black markets and varying levels of criminality that captured the 
attentions of youth. And in every one of these countries there was some form of gopnik-like 
disaffected youth who adapted a similar response to crisis of identity as the gopniki of Russia did 
(for example, the dizelaš of Serbia) – yet they were not exactly the same as gopniki and most have 
been studied even less, to the extent that it would be hard to parse which aspects of the identity 
were original and which were constructed later on. Nevertheless, the meme of the gopnik was 
contributed to and percolated by other Slavic countries enough that by the time the English-
speaking internet got its hand on it the sources were distributed sufficiently for the meme to be 
cemented as one of “squatting Slavs”, with the word gopnik a lesser known afterthought. 
Regardless, creators from across the Slavic world have steadily added to the lore that is the gopnik, 
appropriating them for funny images and videos, attributing various negative trends to them, and 
yet always holding what can only be interpreted as a reverence or sympathy for them. This mania 
has been abetted by various video games that take place in the former USSR, such as 
S.T.A.L.K.E.R. or the Metro games based on Dmitri Glukhovski’s novels, and the proliferation of 
Russian speaking players in FPSs such as Counter Strike using gopnik-like foul language. This is 
part of the reason that two of the most commonly known Russian words to international youth are 
“cyka blyat” – a combination of rather obscene words that generally expresses frustration.99 
 What makes the “squatting Slav” meme popular enough internationally to partially 
dominate the narrative of Russian stereotypes (replacing “hacker” or “spy”), is not immediately 
clear from the information above. It has similar overtones to that of the “Florida Man,” a tinge of 
exoticism and stupidity that can coalesce into a form of idiotic ingenuity at times, yet hardly do 
you see Floridians spreading the memetic narrative of themselves with as much fervor as the Slavic 
community. That songs, movies, television shows, and fashion have been dedicated to, or inspired 
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by the gopnik differentiates its virality from other memes. This pushes us to explore these other 
media to find a root in the identity’s draw outside of as a focus for mockery. 
Music 
Gopniki’s relationship to music is interesting, in that, although no singular music style 
made a unique impression on gopniki, gop-culture has made a lasting impression on music. Unlike 
almost all Russian subcultures of the 1990s, they were not known to rally around a specific genre 
or band. Of course, the music had to be suitable for a “proper man” to listen to, but this did not 
exclude pop, rock, EDM, folk, or patsanskii rap. While this variety in taste could be attributed to 
the lack of connection between gopnik “cells,” none of my sources note music to be an important 
aspect of their identity. Them not listening to a particular form of music, however, does not mean 
that they did not affect the Russian music industry; they have been featured in songs since the late 
Soviet Union, and many artists either came from the same downtrodden suburbs as they, or would 
have been counted among their ranks.  
 As with the “squatting Slav” memes, the gopnik’s appearances in Russian music frequently 
are mocking or negative, however they tend to be presented more as society’s scum rather than 
society’s joke. For example, one of the first appearances of “gopnik” in written text is in Zoopark’s 
(pioneering Russian rock group) 1984 song “Gopniki.” The date of the song is interesting, as the 
youth that would come to be popularized in the 1990s as gopniki were hardly prevalent, not to say 
anything of liubery, and Gorbachev was not even the General Secretary. Even at this early date 
before gopniki, the image painted agrees with the current popular usage of the term “gopnik” in 
Russia to generally refer to a thuggish youth: 
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Who guzzles [khleshchet] warm Port, who doesn’t warm beer in Winter, 
Who spits like a camel, who laughs like a hyena [orig. nightjar, kozodoi]?  
Who shits in our entryways, who yacks on the metro, 
 Who is always ready to black our eyes and jab a pen in your side [vsadit’ vam v bok 
pero]?  
The answer is Gopniki! 
Gopniki! 
Gopnichki!  
They mess up my life [oni meshaiut mne zhit’]!100 
As is evident, Zoopark construct the gopnik as societal scourge for their connected urban 
(dissident) audiences. Rock in the Soviet Union, like almost all forms of music and art, was a 
highly controlled substance up until the fall of Communism; performances were facilitated and 
largely inaccessible or required connections to attend. Thus, like with memes, an image was being 
constructed without the input of its subjects, creating a divide between central and suburban youth. 
 With the fall of the Soviet Union, Russian music was more accessible, but also was quickly 
swamped by Western imports. As the gopniki rose and citizens fought through the “Wild East” of 
the 90s, rap music became more popular in the former Eastern bloc. While not really understanding 
the racial aspects of American hip-hop, many people identified with the struggle for survival, 
safety and success in urban cores. Hip hop gave a language for their anxieties that they did not 
previously have.101 The dizelaš movement in particular (alongside turbofolk) co-opted the hip hop 
look and music.102 In Russia, rap tends to be a much more middle-class affair than in the US, and 
is almost exclusively white (for obvious reasons, and they do not see it as problematic) and has 
frequently been accused of being rather inauthentic.103 However, several rappers have been able to 
carve out (semi) authentic niches, and gopnik-like rappers rank among them.  
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 An excellent example of the mashup between American music and Russian gopnik style is 
Seryoga’s (b. 1976) hit 2004 song “Black Bimmer” (Chyornyi Bumer). It is a delightful clash 
between American hip hop culture and distinctly Russian style. The beat is a virtual copy of Busta 
Rhymes’ 2003 song “I Know What You Want,” and in the various music videos many of his posse 
sport contemporary American street apparel that is woefully out of place in Russia. Counter-posed 
to this, the song opens with, and the beat is dominated by, the accordion (a very popular instrument 
among proletarian Russians) and many of the dancers wear the gopnik’s iconic newsboy cap, 
effectively proving their Russian street cred. Lyrically, the song is distinctly Russian, relating a 
story about his backwater suburban hometown where there were limited opportunities and little 
joy for him aside from his car:104 
I grew up on the edge of a worker’s town (a!) 
A dude with a cool hat, a shabby gold tooth (hop!) 
I’m a dude with ordinary looks, no beauty am I (sho?) 
[…] 
Now our ‘hood was on the outside of town (a!) 
And day and night, bottles clinked all around (hop!) 
The local boys drink hard, they don’t know about fitness (chop!) 
All because there’s no perspectives nor business (lets!) 
Ay, my street had seven buildings [domov], three ‘bandos (a!) 
There’s nothin’ to do here, our cats [murki] howl from toska105 (hop!) 
And there’s nothing I care for ‘til dusk 
When I cruise the neighborhood in my black bimmer106 
Seryoga here is relating an adolescence that many gopniki could identify with – growing up in the 
outskirts of a town, surrounded by decaying identical apartment buildings from the 60s, with little 
else to do but drink. The upbeat melody masks the pain of the lyrics and a sense of almost betrayal. 
Loeb  Gopniki 
39 
 
He reveals that the highest goal a lad from his neighborhood had was attaining a car by any means, 
with the BMW the most coveted. Furthermore, Seryoga is reinforcing gopnik masculinity here, 
portraying women largely as objects to be collected in his music. The lyrics essentially detail him 
buying women with the allure of his black BMW, admitting that it certainly isn’t his looks that 
attract them. Most importantly, though, Seryoga with his #1 hit (in Russia) popularized the gopnik 
look in the early 2000s, queering popular memory of them to something cooler and possibly more 
sympathetic to audiences.107 Beyond Seryoga, contemporary artists such as TOMM¥ €A$H have 
also picked up the gopnik look as way to show their “street cred” in an authentically Slavic way. 
The influence of gopniki on Russian street apparel was certainly significant and will be discussed 
in more depth below. 
 There is one final but important music genre that in recent years has been increasingly 
associated with gopniki – hard bass. Tellingly, hard bass, a genre that is essentially “a Russian take 
on hard house” did not exist until the early 2000s, after the gopnik wave had crested, and did not 
spread outside of St. Petersburg until later.108 The confusion is easily explainable. Videos of 
hooligan Slavic youth (purposefully) in stereotypical gopnik attire aggressively “pump dancing” 
Figure 4: A still from the Black Bimmer music video. Note that Seryoga (center) and several of the 
dancers wear newsboy caps along with obnoxiously stereotypical hip hop attire. 
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to hard bass around their towns as a way to display local pride, or even protest have flooded the 
internet since about 2013.109 This is a curious case where the meme has redefined reality with hard 
bass attributed to gopniki, and thus to Russians due to the prevalence of the meme, post-fact, 
despite the widespread dislike for the genre in Russia itself. 
Film 
Film plays a large part in consumer constructions of masculinity, and movies and television 
certainly helped shape gopnik identity and masculinity, while also being partially (in)formed by 
gopniki. Action and war films present the attributes that makes one a normal’nyi patsan. Although 
the Russian film industry barely scraped by throughout the 90s, films like Brother (1997) and 
Bimmer (2003)110 popularized a violent masculinity as an anti-hero who does what he must, and 
what is ultimately right, to survive the Yeltsin years. While these films came out after the formation 
of the gopnik identity, it is hard to argue that gopnik masculinity was not on the minds of the 
creators as they created their brutal 90s landscapes. Danila of the Brother franchise prowls a broken 
St. Petersburg seemingly inundated with thugs, attempting to find order or safety amidst the chaos, 
safety only he can seemingly provide for himself and those around him. As for depictions of 
gopniki themselves, ideological restrictions of the USSR hardly allowed films to feature 
problematic or “failed” youth in anything but a correctional setting (which happens to be the setting 
of Patsany, a 1983 film dealing with the type of proto-gopnik problematic youth discussed in the 
previous chapter). 
 It was not until perestroika and glasnost that censorship loosened to the extent that films 
featuring societal issues and risqué topics, including the gopnik, could be shown. While not 
explicitly about gopniki,111 the Franco-Russian 1992 film Luna Park centers around 
quintessentially liubera youth. The opening scene is symbolically rife with images of gopnik 
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nationalism and the battles of masculinity that were happening at the time. Starting with a close-
up of a stony-faced Slav, the camera pans back revealing heavily muscled bare-chested liuber 
youth armed with sticks and chains. The group leader tears off his jacket, revealing more muscles 
and a Russian tri-color sash slung Rambo style across his chest as the foes they intend to “clean” 
from Russia are revealed; a horde of leather-laden long-haired bikers whose dirtiness and 
materialism as they motor across a muddy field sharply clashes with the short-haired clean 
aesthetic of the “pure” Russians. The symbolism continues as we switch back to a low angled cut 
of the leader revealing one of Moscow’s “Seven Sisters” and a waving Russian flag in the 
background. Then, to visually demonstrate that Russian = good and West = bad, the leader is 
handed a Coca-Cola can which he proceeds to crush with one hand. After an extended battle with 
hundreds on each side, the scene ends with the main character using a Soviet bulldozer to bury the 
motorcycles, cleansing Russia of them.112 The message could not be more explicit – the invading 
Western identities and cultures are bad and dirty, the home-grown Russian culture must be fought 
Figure 5: Still from the opening scene of Luna Park. 
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for and protected. The scene is a physical manifestation of the battle of identities and masculinities 
that was occurring between gopniki and West-inspired neformaly. The film came out at a time of 
low morale in Russia, rather than being defeatist, it showed Russian civilization triumphing over 
the West. While this was not the only Russian film to positively depict gopnik-type youth, Luna 
Park is distinct for its creation during the heyday of the liubery.  
However, time has not been kind to gopniki in film, as we have also seen in meme culture. 
Perhaps the best-known depiction of them in Russia is that of the Gopniki “Bashka and Rzhavyi” 
from the comedy sketch show Dayosh’ Molodyozh’!113 On air 2009-2013, Bashka and Rzhavyi114 
were the two most popular and longest running characters on the show. ДаЁшь МолодЁжь! 
portrayed the gopnik as exorbitantly dumb, always seeming to get himself into trouble with the 
police, the older boys in the neighborhood or their peers. Unlike the memes being formed around 
gopniki at the same time, the show did try and keep Bashka and Rzhavyi true to the image and 
mannerisms of actual gopniki. The show can be highlighted for its usage of gopnik language, 
introducing it to a wide audience of young adults. Furthermore, the show interestingly makes their 
“gopniki”115 sympathetic characters that, while being bullies at times, never seem to succeed and 
have horrible luck (that said, other real’nye patsany in the show, such as the Botanik’s (gopnik 
slang for nerd) older brother Kaban (Boar) are portrayed as more classically brutal gopniki). On 
top of speaking often in slang, Bashka and Rzhavyi frequently engage in stereotypical gopnik 
behaviors, such as cracking sunflower seeds and drinking light beer while squatting with their feet 
on park benches, extorting peers for cash and mobile phones, and generally loitering in their 
apartment building’s stairwell.116  
Stereotyping and mocking gopniki has become mainstream, and culturally popular. One 
particular Dayosh’ Molodyozh’! skit touches on almost all common gopnik stereotypes, serving as 
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a fictional public service announcement by the “Worldwide Fund of Gopniks” (parodying World 
Wildlife Fund) about the endangered species that is “Gopnicus Europeicus”.117 While “just 15 
years ago they were a large part of our population” police have arrested groups of squatting youth, 
shutdown grandmas illicitly selling sunflower seeds (“we took away their source of sustenance”), 
and replaced the local PTU with “Financial-Economic Academies” (“then we took away their 
natural habitat”). The skit goes onto to ask, “help conserve the gopniki, there are not very many 
left” before stating that the WGF “defends wild people”. The skit acknowledges the disappearance 
of the real gopnik from modern day Russia, but seems almost saddened by the fact that these 
thuggish bumblers have vanished from the suburbs. Just as with the meme and music, there is an 
undercurrent of fascination with these “wild people” that goes beyond open mockery. On the 
surface this fascination seems very different than the championing of the liubera in Luna Park, 
but is it? It is possible that the interest in the gopnik masculinity and character itself is what drives 
their continuing influence on Russian culture. 
Fashion 
Above all else, the realm where the draw of gopnik masculinity is undeniable is the world 
of Russian street wear. As discussed in the previous chapter, Adidas as a brand has a cult status in 
Russia, and not just among gopniki. It was the first major Western brand to enter the USSR, and 
the paucity of factories east of the Iron Curtain made their sneakers and tracksuits especially 
coveted.118 The prevalence of low-quality imitations among suburban youth has inscribed the 
Adidas counterfeit to the gopnik-as-meme’s identity, with “abibas,” four-stripes and other 
egregiously fake articles of clothing attaining a coveted and almost legendary status in their own 
right.119 Alongside “practicing” gopniki, the black Adidas tracksuit was common apparel for 
bouncers and bodyguards in the 90s, many of whom were former gopniki.120 The associative ties 
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between the Adidas tracksuit and the gopnik are so strong that one high-end franchise store made 
fun of the look by putting a squatting mannequin in their store window decked in gopnik Adidas 
attire, with a sign saying “Adidas target audience is no secret… have any seeds?”121 Ultimately, 
the association has proven self-defeating, with the hatred for the gopnik (and the average citizens 
fear of being perceived as one by peers or the police) overriding most feelings of 90s nostalgia for 
most. Even the burst of “New Russians” wearing expensive Adidas tracksuits in an appropriation 
of the gopnik look was short lived. Evidently, Russia was not able to embrace the “revival without 
nostalgia” for the 90s that allowed the dizel look to reappear in 2010s Serbia.122 
 Flying in the face of this sentiment, Gosha Rubchinsky (b. 1984) – one of Russia’s most 
well-known fashion designers internationally (if not the best known) – has embraced the gopnik 
look and masculinity in his aesthetics and shows. Rubchinsky has been known to try and change 
the Western narrative about Russia since his very first show. For him, fashion is a way to redefine 
interpretations of Russia, and the runway a location for staging specific performances of 
masculinity that align with how he’d like Russia to be viewed.123 To the surprise of the fashion 
world, rather than picking classic models to present his works, he frequently uses deliberately 
gopnik-esque youth with close cropped hair and pimply faces.124 His 2017 Spring/Summer show 
in particular is noted for dressing youthful faces in outfits of extreme or brutal masculinity, but to 
what end?125 Is he trying to depict an anti-glamour oil money-free Russian masculinity to the world 
or a vulnerable one? 
 The question becomes more urgent when we consider that his works are not made with the 
Russian consumer in mind, in fact he is not very popular in Russia itself.126 While it may seem 
confusing that Russians would not appreciate a home-grown high-end designer, especially one that 
writes in their native language, such an interpretation ignores that Russians associate Cyrillic on 
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clothing with lower quality, fakes, etc. The exoticism that an English speaker sees in a Gosha 
article is absent for the Russian. Thus, Gosha is designing with the outside in mind, designing to 
convey a certain message about Russia that changes how we think of it.  
This brings us to the guiding question of this project – why choose the gopnik as his 
messenger? What is it about the gopnik that Gosha, and the thousands of content creators on the 
internet, think is worth broadcasting to the outside world? Why document this masculinity, this 
Russian identity, that is such an anathema?  
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Conclusions 
 
The gopnik worldview and gopnik masculinity have a special draw 20 years into Putin’s 
Russia, a draw that was unthinkable in the 1990s. For one, enough time has passed to allow some 
sort of nostalgia for the Yeltsin years to develop, although this is more likely among those who 
have no memory of Communism, or little memory of the Russia during that time. And to an extent, 
this is certainly the population of 15 to 30-year-old Russians, who creates the gopnik-as-meme 
image. A sizable amount of Russia’s youth agree with the conservative direction Putin has taken 
the country, and the stability of a controlled state has a widespread appeal to it in Russia that is 
understandable if you look at its 800-year history. In fact, the openness and liberalism of the 1990s 
is utterly out of place in Russia’s timeline, and the shock of it is apparent in the feelings of chaos 
associated with the period. While many youths rebelled against the former Communist morality 
and limitations, the gopniki stayed the tried and true Russian course. 
In fact, the nationalist, anti-West, patriarchal and circle-the-wagons views held by gopniki 
are generally commonplace in modern day Russia, although they were utterly against the grain 
around the fall of the USSR. In a sense, the gopnik was altogether anachronistic. His beliefs, style 
and reverences were/are always stuck in the past in one form or another: he revered the Soviet 
Union and Russian pride when his country was obsessed with the West. He was xenophobic, 
homophobic, and oppressively patriarchal at a time when Russia was relaxing the uptight 
moralities of Bolshevik ideology. He held traditional Rus’ian ideas of how a man should act, hold 
himself in society, and interact with women. All of these were woefully out of place in the 1990s, 
but have moved to front and center under Putin. Popular nowadays is the idea of the muzhik, the 
real man, an idea not very dissimilar from the gopnik’s “real’nyi patsan”, differing mainly in its 
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reverence for law, order, and stability rather than for criminal/street culture. While the gopniki will 
always be hated by the urban elite for their abrasiveness, foul language, poor manners, and violence 
it is more than coincidence that their image has become so prevalent in modern day Russia, despite 
them having vanished long ago. It is unquestionable that their actions against other subcultures 
would not be frowned upon nowadays. Gopnik-like groups, such as the “ultras” of football clubs, 
frequently are deployed to break up protests by progressives, giving the state and the police a level 
of plausible deniability, and presenting an air of the people being on the side of conservatism. 
Another national attraction of the gopniki, are their authentically Russian status. The 
gopniki developed organically as a defiant Russian identity at a time when Russia was being 
culturally taken over, and, in the minds of many nowadays, purposefully destroyed, by the West. 
The gopnik represents a misunderstood form of “nash” that looks to protect Russians from the 
encroaching outside world – that which is “ne nash” or “chuzhoi.” There is a sentiment, long held 
by Russians, that they are the last bastion of conservatism and Christianity after Constantinople 
fell. That they are encircled by those who wish to see them fall – a sentiment that has only been 
strengthened by events such as the invasions of the Golden Horde, Napoleon, the Nazis, and the 
encroachment of NATO after the Cold War. Furthermore, the gopniki revered an unattainable 
“better past,” when Russia was acknowledged as a global superpower, and the world was properly 
ordered. In recent years, Putin has heightened official nostalgia of Russia’s geopolitical peaks 
during Socialism, notably reviving the specter of Stalin as a figure more positive than not. People 
look at what the gopniki believed in, and agree with it as they too look for a period of time filled 
with purpose and the respect they believe they deserve.  
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The resurgent popularity of the gopnik reflects the national populism that is currently 
sweeping through parts of Europe and the West. An attachment to national tradition is a 
comfortable and familiar anchor in a turbulent world. The gopniki have been both decades behind 
their times, and decades ahead, but always rooted in a prideful Russian identity. And as with 
populist cultures that attract a following in other countries, they reflect a deeper sentiment that 
must be understood and must not be disregarder and disdained. This study highlights that the 
current popularity of gopniki is far from an entertaining meme of squatting Slavs in tracksuits. 
Rather, it is a measurement of the clash between Western globalized culture and traditional views 
of Russian identity. In the years ahead, whether the gopnik culture waxes or wanes, their presence 
will reveal much about the sentiment of Russian culture towards globalization and the Western 
world. 
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pattern of urban flight in the US of the rich to the suburbs, immigrant and poor communities are pushed to the 
outskirts in Russia. Thus ‘suburban youth’ are primarily from lower / working class families. 
7 Stagnation is the name for the late Brezhnev period, about 1975 to 1984, when the USSR’s leaders were old, 
policies unchanging and stale, and the economy hobbling along. 
8 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble. 
9 Elena Zdravomyslova and Anna Temkina, “The Crisis of Masculinity in Late Soviet Discourse.” 15 
10 Per Zdravomyslova, gender order is a hierarchical system of relations between and among genders that 
encompasses all aspects of life, for example “marked” vs. “un-marked” positions such as a “female” policeman or 
“male” nurse. When we hear certain words or professions, we have an assumed gender that goes with it. 
11 Sandra Lee Bartky, “Foucault, Femininity, and the Modernization of Patriarchal Power.”  
12 R. W. Connell and James Messerschmidt, “Hegemonic Masculinity.” 832 
13 It is worth noting that all masculinities are in a constant state of renegotiation and adapt to maintain male 
dominance in some form 
14 Ibid.,  847-848 
15 All-Union Leninist Communist League of Youth, “Vsesoiuznyi Leninskii KOMmunisticheskii SOiuz 
MOLodyozhii”, i.e. Komsomol 
16 Here “naturally” is used to contrast against the deliberated construction (relatively) free from negotiation that was 
Soviet masculinity – the top stated the ways to live and people followed. 
17 Stakhanovism was a movement in the 1930s inspired by the extremely productive miner Alexei Stakhanov (1906-
1977). “Shock workers” would emulate his ‘super-human’ feats and try to exceed the quota. Record holding workers 
were frequently awarded with apartments, cars, and chances to travel. Men and women were Stakhanovites. 
18 Elena Zdravomyslova and Anna Temkina, “The Crisis of Masculinity in Late Soviet Discourse.” 21-22 
19  Ibid.. 13 
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20 Jochen Hellbeck, Revolution on My Mind. 350 
21 Michelle Smirnova, “Multiple Masculinities.” 210; Anekdoty are a type of Soviet (and Russian) humor in the form 
of stories set in a handful of well-known tropes 
22 William Rosenberg, Bolshevik Visions. Multiple locations; “Bolshevik Visions” is a collection of early Bolshevik 
texts on the theorization of family life, intimacy, and gender roles under Communism.  
23 Michelle Smirnova, “Multiple Masculinities.” 214 
24 R. W. Connell and James Messerschmidt, “Hegemonic Masculinity.” 848 
25 J. Halberstam, “An Introduction to Female Masculinity.” 2 
26 Elena Zdravomyslova and Anna Temkina, “The Crisis of Masculinity in Late Soviet Discourse.” 26 
27 Pierre Bourdieu, Masculine Domination. viii 
28 Wherein the vagina and penis are made as discursively distinct, one representing power/top, the other oriented 
with submission/bottom, and the symbolic dualities (i.e. wet/dry, soft/hard, inside/outside) that are used to legitimize 
the division, even though they are circularly based on this socially constructed division. 
29 Keep in mind that the ‘simple’ task of shopping for groceries in the eternal deficit economy of the Soviet Union 
could be a monumental task requiring the waiting in hours long lines and visiting multiple stores in the hopes they 
will have milk or eggs or other basic goods. 
30 William Rosenberg, Bolshevik Visions. See Kollontai’s article for example, 67-76 
31 Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon Averted. 60-62 
32 “Life has become better! Life has become more cheerful!” - Stalin 
33 Roughly translates to an affinity group or club 
34 Figure adapted from Hilary Pilkington, Russia’s Youth and Its Culture. 
35 C. J. Pascoe, “‘Dude, You’re a Fag.’” 
36 Such as the ‘Pioneers’ and ‘Little Octobrists’ 
37 Jochen Hellbeck, Revolution on My Mind. 356 
38 Elena Omelchenko and Guzel Sabirova, “Youth Cultures in Contemporary Russia.” 255 
39 Felix Krawatzek, “Fallen Vanguards and Vanished Rebels?” 181-182 
40 Hilary Pilkington, Russia’s Youth and Its Culture. 50, the Komsomol did actively destroy rival formal and 
informal youth programs. 
41 Felix Krawatzek, “Fallen Vanguards and Vanished Rebels?” 182 
42 Felix Krawatzek, Youth in Regime Crisis. 150, Italics removed 
43 Patricia Hill Collins, “It’s All in the Family.” 63 
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44 In fact, before sharply retracting any tentative support for LGBT starting around 1927, significant research was 
done into sexuality with the head of the Health Commissariat publishing a book stating homosexuality as completely 
natural. It is also interesting to note that before the Europeanization of Russia (notable as the time when Jesus 
changed from being clearly Middle Eastern to Scandinavian White in all icons and depictions), homosexuality was 
common and seen as natural.  
45 William Rosenberg, Bolshevik Visions. Referencing several articles contained within 
46  Ibid.. 21, quoting Lenin’s “Tasks of the Youth Leagues” 
47 Hilary Pilkington, Russia’s Youth and Its Culture. Chapter 4; According to Pilkington, in 1986 there were only six 
music cafes in all of Moscow! This was a major complaint people had about the Komsomol – youth wanted places 
to informally congregate and the state was not providing them with it. 
48 Note, money was not an inhibitor to goods in Soviet Russia, rather it was access to goods based on your position 
in the Party or your connections. Goods were acquired po blatu -- like quid pro quo, but it was a system of favors 
(blat) by which you could get a TV, entry to University, oranges, etc. 
49 “Changes” the word here having extra meaning at the time due to its connection to Viktor Tsoi’s song in the 
movie Assa 
50 Hilary Pilkington, Russia’s Youth and Its Culture; Pilkington and Ignorant, “‘If You Want to Live, You Better 
Know How to Fight’”; Omelchenko and Sabirova, “Youth Cultures in Contemporary Russia.” 
51 Евгеный Мори, “Гопники.” Translation my own 
52 В. В. Гаврилюк, “Гопники Как Феномен в Среде Молодежи.” 127 
53 Joachim Habeck and Aimar Ventsel, “Consumption and Popular Culture among Youth in Siberia”, 7; В. В. 
Гавилюк, “Гопники Как Феномен в Среде Молодежи”, 127; Я. Левин and М. Эймс, “Куда ты делся, русский 
гопник?” 
54 Евгеный Мори, “Гопники.” 
55 It is important to note here that this is all speculation, and that the G.O.P. itself may just be a St. Petersburg myth. 
An informative exploration of the origin of the word “gopnik” is on the Russian language Wikipedia page for gopniki. 
56 Catriona Kelly, Children’s World. 193 
57 In Russian, “peasant,” krestianin, is still a common (and not as derogatory as in English) word to refer to those 
who live in provincial areas / those who practice agriculture. 
58  Ibid. 205 
59  Ibid.  201, 205 
60  Ibid, 197 
61  Ibid. 230 
62  Ibid. 208 
63  Ibid.. 230, 232-3 
64  Ibid. 238 
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65 Hilary Pilkington, Russia’s Youth and Its Culture. 103 
66  Ibid. 
67  Ibid. 188 
68  Ibid. 109 
69 Anastasiia Fedorova, “Adidas, a Love Story.” 
70 Hilary Pilkington, Russia’s Youth and Its Culture. 189 
71 Евгеный Мори, “Гопники.” 
72 В. В. Гаврилюк, “Гопники Как Феномен в Среде Молодежи.” 128-130 
73 Михаил Лурье and Валентин Головин, “Идеологические и Территориальные Сообщества Молодежи.” 67 
74 “Негласные правила советских гопников.” 
75 A more contemporary line being something like “do ya have a cell on you?” 
76 В. В. Гаврилюк, “Гопники Как Феномен в Среде Молодежи.” 130 
77  Ibid. 130 
78 Евгеный Мори, “Гопники.” 
79 Ирина Костерина, “Конструкты и Практики Маскулинности в Провинциальном Городе.” 127 
80 And those who mocked them 
81 B. B. Гаврилюк, “Гопники Как Феномен в Среде Молодежи”; Ирина Костерина, “Конструкты и Практики 
Маскулинности в Провинциальном Городе.” 
82 In Russian it has connotations with youth, i.e. in standard speech it is how you would refer to a young boy or 
teenager, not necessarily a young man. 
83 Ирина Костерина, “Конструкты и Практики Маскулинности в Провинциальном Городе.” 128 
84 Hilary Pilkington, Russia’s Youth and Its Culture. 187 
85 Каринэ Берберова, “Эволюция моделей маскулинности в российском обществе.” 202, quoting Ushakin 
(translation mine) 
86 Михаил Лурье and Валентин Головин, “Идеологические и Территориальные Сообщества Молодежи.” 60-
61 
87 Ibid. 63 
88 Also, their lack of official ties to organized crime differentiate them from some other territorial urban youth 
cultures. 
89 Note that this word for community is more in line with an understanding of its English counterpart when used in 
reference to i.e. the gay “community”, or the journalist “community”. “obschestvo” on the other hand is more in line 
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with ideas of society as a whole, the neighborhood “community” – a mosh posh of people in a given place rather 
than a group with shared ideals. (Continued from above) 
90 B. B. Гаврилюк, “Гопники Как Феномен в Среде Молодежи.” 127 
91 Сергей Тихомиров, “«Креатив» в Молодежной Культуре: Особенности Конструирования Образа 
Гопника.” Multiple  sources cited in the article about gopniki as an internet phenomenon date to before 2010. It is 
interesting to note that most of these cites that “collect” information and images of gopniki no longer exist, their 
domains have frustratingly expired or been bought by someone else. 
92 Sasha Raspopina, “Opinion.” 
93 “Meme | Definition of Meme by Merriam-Webster.” 
94 A good example of one of these Russian meme creators is the video collecting Instagram account “Look at This 
Russian”. 
95 Сергей Тихомиров, “«Креатив» в Молодежной Культуре: Особенности Конструирования Образа 
Гопника.” 156 
96 Я. Левин and М. Эймс, “Куда ты делся, русский гопник?” 
97 “Russia”; “Internet Penetration United States 2017.” 
98 Сергей Тихомиров, “«Креатив» в Молодежной Культуре: Особенности Конструирования Образа 
Гопника.” 160 
99 Meaning “bitch whore/fuck” and, as said, expressing frustration. It is interesting that сука is stylized in Cyrillic, 
yet блядь is in Latin. 
100 “Зоопарк - Гопники - Текст Песни.” 
101 Milosz Miszczynski and Adriana Helbig, “Introduction.” 2 
102 Jovana Papović and Astrea Pejović, “Revival without Nostalgia.” 83 
103 Milosz Miszczynski and Adriana Helbig, “Introduction.” 1 
104 The following is my translation, however, it is influenced by that from https://lyricstranslate.com/ru/CHERNYI-
BUMER-Black-Bmw.html 
105 There is much written on the meaning of toska, and I will refrain from translating it here. 
106 “Серёга (Seryoga) – Чёрный Бумер (Black Beamer) Lyrics | Genius Lyrics.” 
107 A funny anecdote: the song was/is so popular that its tune is used to teach Russian words at the Concordia 
Language Village camp. 
108 Aleks Eror, “Russia’s Hard Bass Scene Is Completely Insane.” 
109 Aleks Eror.; https://youtu.be/y90yaLFoYoA is an excellent example of pump dancing. 
110 Not directly connected to Black Bimmer, but both helped promote the other. 
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111 Technically the film is about neo-Nazis, but searching liubera on the Runet gives back stills from the opening scene 
as image examples. It is widely agreed that while the directors call them neo-Nazis, the men depicted are undeniably 
liubera. 
112 Pavel Lungin, Луна-Парк. (1992г.). 
113 “Go young people! Go!” 
114 “Rusty” in reference to his red hair. 
115 As opposed to real life gopniki 
116 An interesting inclusion by Dayosh’ Molodyozh’ is the gopnitsa, the female gopnik, in many of their skits. The 
gopnitsa is a newer phenomenon, and not really attached to the predominately male movement of the 1990s. Instead, 
it is a derogatory word used to describe “trashy” urban teen girls. A possible cultural equivalent is the “kogal” of 
Japan. The gopnitsa in the show, “Shakira,” is portrayed in generally negative terms for any Russian audience. She 
chews with her mouth open, has a gold tooth, opens beer with her teeth, has bad manners, has an annoying laugh, is 
violent, and spits sunflower seeds on the pavement. 
117 Даешь Молодежь! Дайджест - Спецвыпуск Башка и Ржавый 2.; This and the following quotes are from the 
skit that starts at 4:29. 
118 Anastasiia Fedorova, “Adidas, a Love Story.” 
119 I saw several people four-stripe “adidas” sneakers while in Russia. 
120 Anastasiia Fedorova, “Adidas, a Love Story.” 
121 Сергей Тихомиров, “«Креатив» в Молодежной Культуре: Особенности Конструирования Образа 
Гопника.” 159 
122 Jovana Papović and Astrea Pejović, “Revival without Nostalgia.” 
123 Graham Roberts, “Angels with Dirty Faces.” 21 
124 Ibid. 30 
125  Ibid. 31 
126 Miles Klee, “‘Slav Squat’ Meme History.” 
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